ACCIDENT & INVESTIGATION (2) - Galley Fires on three different vessels...
The
following extracts are taken from the UK MAIB Safety Digest…..
Narrative 1
A 3,222gt
general cargo vessel arrived in port and by 1830 was secured alongside. With
cargo discharge not due to start until 0600 the following morning, the crew
were stood down with just one seaman doing a "night aboard." Although
some crew members went ashore, most, including two superintendents who were on
board, retired to their cabins. Those who had gone ashore returned by midnight.
The chief engineer and the watchkeeper stayed up watching TV until about 0130
when the chief engineer retired to his cabin, leaving just the watchkeeper
awake and preparing some food in the galley.
At about
0310, the fire alarm sounded. Investigation indicated a fire in the upper
engine room, steering gear, or separator room, although smoke was evident in
the accommodation. The general alarm was sounded, shore authorities informed,
and the ship's whistle sounded. Further investigation by the chief engineer
established there was little or no smoke in the engine room. However, when he
checked the accommodation fan room he found it full of smoke. Realising the
fire was in the accommodation, he retired to the open deck where the master
confirmed that four seamen were missing. The chief officer, wearing an SCBA
set, rescued two seamen from their cabins, while other officers found one of
the superintendents unconscious, behind his cabin door. With the watchman
unaccounted for and thick smoke found in the mess room, the master and chief
officer, both wearing SCBA sets, entered the area to carry out a search. They
found the galley door shut but radiating intense heat. They eventually found
the missing seaman, unconscious, on the port side.
Two
fire-fighters, who meanwhile had boarded the vessel, assisted in removing the
seaman to the open deck, but he later died. Further investigation confirmed
that the seat of the fire was the galley stove. The source was overheated
cooking oil in a chip pan that had been placed on top of the galley stove. The
result of this fire in human terms was one dead, three crew members requiring a
lengthy period of convalescence, and three others suffering from smoke
inhalation. In financial terms, the fire caused considerable smoke and heat
damage to the galley and mess room, and minor smoke damage to the accommodation
and service spaces.
Narrative 2
A 20,446gt
ro-ro vehicle/passenger ferry was on passage from the UK to France. At about
1715, a new heating element was fitted to a deep fat fryer in one of the
passenger galleys. It was then refilled with oil, the electrical supply
reconnected, and the unit switched on. Some time later, the galley supervisor
noticed that the temperature of the oil had risen above its normal operating
range of 170°C, so took the following action:
- telephoned
for the assistance of an electrical officer
- placed the
fire cover over the fryer
- turned the
operating switch to the "off" position.
The
temperature of the oil, however, continued to rise and, once it reached 260°C,
smoke was seen. A further temperature rise to 320°C resulted in the vapours
igniting. The flames were smothered using a fire blanket, and the bridge was
informed of the situation. The electrical supply was isolated at the local
distribution box, and the fire was extinguished using a combination of the
fixed water Hi-fog system, portable foam and CO2 extinguishers. Further
investigation found that the "on/off" switch energised a coil in the
contactor unit to engage the power supply. In this case, one or more of the
contacts inside the contactor unit had fused together, allowing current to flow
to the heating element continually as long as the power supply was connected.
This effectively bypassed the local "on/off" control switch. In
addition to the repairs to the existing system, a local electrical isolation
switch was fitted adjacent to the deep fat fryer.
Narrative 3
A ro-ro
vehicle/passenger ferry was on passage. In one of the passenger galleys, the
staff were beginning preparations for cooking lunch. As part of the
preparations, a tray of cooking oil was placed in one of the ovens to heat up.
Everyone forgot it was there until about 1230, when a member of staff noticed
smoke emitting from the oven. The oven door was opened very briefly and then
closed again quickly, the power to the oven and galley were tripped off, the
space vacated and all the shutters were closed. The bridge was informed and a
fire party assembled to stand by while the oil cooled down.
The Lessons
Heating
cooking oil can be a very dangerous business indeed UNLESS a safe system of
work is followed, with safety devices fitted and working. It has a flash point
in the region of 310° to 360°C. The minimum flash point of the cooking medium
should be 315°C (600°F).
Deep fat
fryers should be fitted with fire safety lids, with a second thermostat to
provide a thermal cut-out, (see Merchant Shipping Notice M1022).
Ordinary
cooking pots filled with cooking oil are not, and cannot be used as, chip pans!
Just a moment's inattention can result in overflow, a serious fire, and the
generation of thick and potentially lethal smoke.
THINK
SAFETY. Have fire blankets and fire smothering equipment readily to hand, fit
electrical isolators close to the equipment (NOT above it!) and ensure that
catering staff who operate the equipment always follow safe procedures. Above
all, never use water to extinguish a fire, and never ever carry a pot/pan of
hot oil out of the area in which you are working. Water will instantly turn to
steam and explode, and shower hot and burning oil everywhere. Remember:
attempting to carry a pot/pan of burning or hot oil will usually result in it spilling
over the person carrying it.
