Fatal accident during mooring operation

Fatal accident during mooring operation

Official report: (Edited from Statens haverikommission (SHK) Swedish Accident Investigation Authority – Report S-95/11)

                         A general cargo ship arrived with an import cargo that was stacked high on the hatch covers, exposing a large lateral wind area. A strong offshore wind was blowing during the final approach to the berth (starboard side to) with a pilot on board, but it had been already decided that the docking could be safely completed without tug assistance.

 

Picture briefing the view of an accident.

                     
                 The forward mooring team on the forecastle consisted of the C/O, Bosun and an able seaman (AB). The vessel was fitted with a large wavebreaker right forward, which meant that the forecastle deck had very little clear area. Standing on a small bulwark platform on the starboard side, the C/O was
leading the team and also operating the mooring winches remote control levers located close by. The bridge team had no view of the forward mooring station due to the tallwavebreaker and high deck cargo.

                          The ship approached the berth at an angle of about 30 degrees and, with her bow close to the jetty, the forward spring line was sent ashore and belayed on a bollard. In order to bring the stern closer to the quay the pilot requested slow ahead on the engine and full port rudder. In addition, the bow thruster was activated to port so as to align the ship parallel with the wharf.
Before undertaking this manoeuvre, the Master warned the foredeck team on the portable VHF radio that the engine would be working ahead and that all personnel should stand clear of the taut backspring. This was acknowledged by the C/O, but for unknown reasons, he remained at his position. 
               
                The engine and rudder movement was performed but had to be repeated within minutes as the stern did not move sufficiently towards the quay. Again, before the engine movement, the Master called out a warning to the foredeck team and got confirmation from the C/O but he remained at his location near the winch remote control unit. This time, the engine order lasted longer, and probably due to the bow moving ahead and away from the shore, the backspring came under very high tension and suddenly parted. The broken rope end snapped back violently and hit the C/O on the head and neck, who was felled and lay motionless. Unfortunately, despite all efforts by crew and paramedics, the ambulance doctor declared the C/O dead soon after.

Investigation of the accident

1 The spring line had only been in use for a month and appeared to be in good condition;

2 The method used to berth a high-sided vessel without tug assistance in the prevailing conditions by working engine, rudder and bow thruster against a single backspring constituted a high risk manoeuvre;

3 The C/O failed to move away from snap back zone even after being warned by Master;

4 Poor design - Confined/restricted area on the forecastle deck and improper location of winch remote control unit;

5 The company had no specific guidelines for mooring and the company management had not identified mooring to be a hazardous operation.

Editor’s Note: Although the report does not specify the actual point of failure of the hawser, it is likely that the newly inducted line parted at a stress point or nip that would have developed at the multi-angle fairlead when the vessel was moved with a prolonged ahead engine kick. This incident clearly illustrates how the sudden linear contraction of a synthetic fibre rope parting under excessive tension can cause injury/damage at a considerable distance from the point of failure.